DI Reprint: 02-02-2009 (Part 1 of 3)

Shadowboxing the Bush Doctrine
Part one in a three-part series

In the days after Sept. 11, 2001, then-President George W. Bush and his neoconservative administration developed a modified version of the international anticipatory self-defense doctrine under the precept of self-preservation. The so-called "Bush Doctrine" was designed to eliminate all current and future threats to American military personnel and civilians. However, the "war on terror" as implemented by the Bush administration was not a viable option to accomplish the very goal it continually espoused, protecting the American public from future terrorism. Seven years later, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain at-large; Al Qaeda continues to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq; and the threat of harm to American civilians abroad still exists, as demonstrated by the recent Mumbai terrorist attacks.

For the last seven years, the Bush administration has waged a war on its own reflection. While the media and the White House went to great lengths to portray our "war on terror" as an unambiguous battle of good versus evil and a straightforward example of self-defense against provocation, a more in-depth examination of the strategies and tactics employed by both the United States and the jihadi Islamist factions reveals significant similarities between the quintessential adversaries. Militarily and rhetorically, the two foes employed strategies that were mirror images of each other creating a never-ending cycle of violent acts of reprisal.

At their cores, both the Bush Doctrine and the jihadi military doctrine are self-defense strategies; both doctrines are modified versions of an anticipatory self-defense doctrine. The Bush Doctrine is a modern adaptation of the Caroline doctrine; Al Qaeda reinterprets classical jihad jurisprudence to justify its military operations. The common revision in both doctrines is the reshaping of the "threat" element of anticipatory self-defense. A state must face an imminent threat that leaves the state with no time for deliberate or alternative means of defense to justify the use of preemptive military action. Without a threat, an "act of self-defense" is unwarranted. The jihadi defense doctrine requires Muslims must be attacked because of their faith for aggression to be justified.

In order to justify the use of force, both the Bush Doctrine and Al Qaeda's doctrine argue that the threshold is not an "imminent threat" but an "emerging threat." No longer must the United States or the umma, the worldwide community of Muslims, be a victim of an attack to justify the use of defensive measures, a threat of violence is sufficient to justify force; a first-strike policy is portrayed as a defensive response. Thus begins the bloody tit-for-tat cycle of violence in the "war on terror"; reports of a pre-emptive strike by one adversary are viewed as an emerging threat by the other. Unlike the Cold War, in which the threat of an armed response created a stalemate, the "war on terror" uses the threat of an armed response as justification for using "defensive military force."

Perhaps the acts of pre-emptive force could be better contained and force a tenuous Cold-War-like impasse if both doctrines didn't also espouse "guilt by association." Al Qaeda, and other jihadi Islamist factions, continually equates the actions of Israel against the Arab world with those of the United States. This amalgamation is evinced by the recurrent label of "Zionist-Crusader coalition" by bin Laden when he references the United States. The "guilt" is also extended to any of America's allies, as evinced by the bombings in Madrid, London, and Baghdad. No country that aids the United States in their "war" will be safe. According to the speeches of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, you are either with them, or against them. Sound familiar? Bush said, "We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them." Rightly, the Bush administration made clear that the United States was willing to defend itself and its allies from terrorist activity. In other words, the United States is willing to defend its "umma" from outside threats.

It is not my intent to argue that the rationale or morality at the foundation of these doctrines is the same. Clearly they are not equivalent. Rather, my comparison rests in the means by which each doctrine intends to achieve victory. Both doctrines are designed to reject compromise and reconciliation; victory is attained only through vanquishing the Great Adversary. If both doctrines espouse a determination to continue their struggle, their jihad, as long as the enemy or threat of harm exists, we must examine whether the means will ever achieve the desired end. Punching your reflection in the mirror isn't going to destroy your mirror image; it will only shatter and fragment the glass. The Bush Doctrine may have kept America's shores safe over the last seven years; however, it failed to secure long-term stability and protection from terrorist threats.


Originally published in The Daily Iowan