According to this BBC Article ("US pits Iraqi Sunnis against al-Qaeda") the new "exit" strategy in Iraq is to arm and train local warlords. The article uses the euphemism "Sunni tribal sheikhs" instead of warlords but any time the military trains and arms "local tribes and factions" it is only a matter of time before we - or they - start referring to them as "warlords." Warlord and factional disputes have left Afghanistan an almost completely lawless - in the sense of a formal central government controlling the rule of law - state, with Kubal as the only city the United States has any firm control over.
It is incredibily ironic that we are training local factions and militant groups to fight off a "freedom fighter" faction we helped arm and train 20 years earlier. The Islamist dogma that the Afghan mujahideen propogated didn't seem to bother us 20 years ago when it was focused on fighting and killing Soviets. In 20 years, will these Iraqi factions be the next al-Qaeda?
The U.S. Military is training these factions under the auspices of the Iraqi police force. However, each faction is to "secure their own areas." How long until these factions start a civil war - assuming the Bush Administration's current view that there is no civil war in Iraq - or start killing civilians in a territorial battle when U.S. troops finally leave? General Lynch's words offer little solace. He is quoted as saying:"There are tribal sheikhs out there who say: 'Hey, just allow me to be the local security force. I don't care what you call me. You can call me whatever you want. Just give me the right training and equipment and I'll secure my area.' And that's the direction we're moving out there."
"US commanders on the ground have been authorised and encouraged to enter into truces and agreements with local Sunni factions wherever possible, even if they are suspected of using arms against US forces in the past." (emphasis added)
The article and US military strategists point to the al-Anbar province as the archetype of success and future stability with this policy. The article points out that al-Qaeda had attacked police recruitment posts, which helped generate more antipathy towards al-Qaeda in the province. Perhaps it is the cynic in me, but I find it hard to believe that the al-Anbar province success will apply to the entirety of the country and recent success doesn't guarantee long-term safety for Iraqi civilians or US troops.
The reason this appears to be a failure to learn from history is that this is exactly what we had with the Afghan fighters 20 years ago: a common enemy that everyone could rally around as unwelcome and a threat to local interests. The problem wasn't getting the Afghan mujahideen to fight the Soviets. The problems was what to do with the armed fighters once the Soviets were defeated and withdrew. (For a fascinating book on the evolution of the jihadi ideology and firsthand accounts of influential members of the movement read The Journey of the Jihadist) We can't untrain these fighters once we give them the means to kill. In the short-term, this new local armenment policy may help suppress al-Qaeda's influence and military operations. I just hope it doesn't come back to haunt our children and grandchildren.
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